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THE REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
SPORTS COMPETITION:

DOWN FROM MOUNT OLYMPUS
James A. R. Nafziger*
The continuing reverberations from the "ping-pong diplomacy" of
the Peoples' Republic of China, political pulsations from the 1969
"soccer war" between Honduras and El Salvador, and the emerging
influence of world sports standards in combatting apartheidpolicies in
southern Africa have stimulated fresh interest in the interplay between
transnational sports and politics. The growing importance of this
interaction is underscored by the increasing frequency of such
sports-related items in international coverage by the mass media.
Despite the apparent importance of such athletic diplomacy within
the world community, the informed scholarly response has been
negligible. To be sure, the role of transnational competition as either
an agent or a catalyst of world order has been the focus of
considerable intuitive and theoretical commentary. Only rarely,
however, have the resulting theories and hypotheses been submitted to
empirical examination and analysis. 1 Consequently, it is not surprising
that there has been little systematic study of the world-order
implications of the rules and norms that govern the administration of
transnational sports competition. This deficiency may reflect that
lesser importance is attached to the underlying scope-value of skill
than to such values as power, wealth and well-being.
This article seeks first to identify the behavioral and organizational
characteristics, and to clarify the shared goals of transnational sports
competition. Against this background, the article will examine the
formal characteristics of decision-making within the Olympic Movement,2 whose quadrennial Games provide the most highly developed

* Administrative Director, American Society of International Law; Lecturer,
the Catholic University of America School of Law. B.A., 1962, M.A., 1969, University of Wisconsin; J.D.,1967, Harward Law School. The author wishes to thank
Monique Berlioux, Director of Administration and Information of the International Olympic Committee, for her cooperation, courtesy and responsiveness in
reply to his many inquiries.
1. But see J. MEYNAUD, SPORT ET POLITIQUE (1966).
2. The organization of the modern Olympic Games has been chosen as a
paradigm for this study because of several factors: first, the propinquity of the
1972 Olympics and the length of the pertinent historical experience; second, the

fora for these events. Finally, four case studies are used to evaluate the
Olympic organization's performance-that is, the efficacy of relevant
policies, rules and procedures that are available to decision-makers to
achieve the shared goals of the organization. Several modest proposals
are advanced. Aside from these, however, a comprehensive pre-

scription of alternative policies, rules and procedures must await
subsequent research.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS

AND

GOALS OF SPORTS COMPETITION

A. General Characteristicsof Athletic Activity
Sports competition is conflict for its own sake involving rewards
which are typically intrinsic: individual pleasure, satisfaction and
accolades. Such conflict generally constitutes a zero-sum game-what
one side wins, the other loses.' This characterization may not apply,
however, to the individual activities of the Olympic Games, such as
track and field events and swimming, where the multiplicity of both
national allegiances and rewards in the form of gold, silver and bronze
medals suggest a more than zero-sum game. This diffusion of gain and
loss may reduce the threat of international tension in the Olympics.
Notwithstanding this qualification, sports contests seem to function
characteristically as a ritual of conflict or pseudo-event in which
action is influenced, not by shared tasks which might generate
cooperation, but rather by shared ritual and rules,4 which both
engender and control conflict. Whether that conflict leads to
international tension is of major concern to all participants in
transnational sports competition.
In all team endeavors, two relevant concepts of social interaction may be distinguished: cooperation among members of the
same team, and association among members of opposing teams.

importance from the public viewpoint of the Games as a theater of interaction
within the athletic sphere; third, the availability of related data; fourth, the
significance to international law of the continuing transformation within the
Olympic organization from a reliance upon discretionary decision-making to a
quasi-legal process of rule-creation and supervision; and finally, the organizational
feature of interaction among individual, non-governmental and governmental
components.
3. See, e.g., Liischen, Cooperation, Association, and Contest, 14 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 21 (1970). This article contains a very useful theoretical
and empirical study of certain sociological components of athletic competition.
4. See Nieburg, Agonistics-Rituals of Conflict, 391 ANNALS 56 (1970).
The philosopher Paul Weiss has defined sport as a "rule-governed bodily
adventure."
Vol. 5-No. 1
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Cooperation, with its elements of liking and mutual dependency,
emerges when rewards are shared within a group. Association, on the
other hand, is merely a degree of toleration by which groups
accommodate their respective self-interests, but not so much as to
preclude conflicts of interests and continuing competition.' The
strength of the association among members of opposing teams relates
to such external influences as sports organizations; spectators;
symbolic identification with schools, communities and nations; and
the social-cultural milieu. In regulated sports competition, these

influences operate within a competitive atmosphere characterized by
an artificially generated and controlled tension. Other characteristics
include the non-representative nature of the conflict, the observation
of ritual, and a systemic response fundamentally to a rule-premised
equilibrium. The external influences operating within this context
may serve to expose sports competition to disassociation and
unprescribed conflict as contrasted with the characteristic task-sharing
patterns of cooperation present among members of the same team.
Although it is widely believed that sport functions cathartically to
eliminate conflict among groups, available data suggest that this is an
overstatement. Actually, since genuine cooperation would be self-defeating in athletic competition, the social relationship between athletic
opponents indicates only a limited integrative function.6 There is no
established correlation between transnational athletic activity and the
development of social order.
A better case can be made, however, for the argument that sport is
a microcosm of society. This contention is supported by the close
correlation between individual motivation and capacity,7 the presence
of increased specialization' among athletes as in society as a whole

5. Liischen, supra note 3, at 25, 26. Liischen acknowledges his debt to Max
Weber for the distinction between vergemeinschaftung and vergesellschaftung.
6. Liischen, supra note 3; Heinilai, Notes on the Inter-Group Conflicts in
International Sport, 1 INT'L REV. OF SPORT SOCIOLOGY 31 (1966). This
study which is premised on an analytical distinction between "in-group" and
"out-group" attitudes is noteworthy to the international lawyer particularly
because of its rule-oriented plea for an "identification and clarification of the very
concept of fair play," about which there is a surprising lack of consensus, and
thereafter for a "common recognition of and a commitment to the clarified
principles and norms by international authorities." Id. at 37.
7. Janeau, Sport et Psychologie, 3 SPORT: REVUE BELGE DE
L'EDUCATION PHYSIQUE, DES SPORTS ET DE LA VIE EN PLEIN AIR 194
(1970).
8. Noting a trend toward greater specialization, quantification and reliance
on equipment, one writer comments that "play is changing everywhere from a
Winter, 1971
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and by the demise of the myth that sport operates as a privileged
sanctuary from real life. One need only be reminded that although the
Greek Olympic tradition was inspired by the ideal of educating
harmonious human types, and was self-enforced for 1200 years, it
nonetheless degenerated into commercialism, violence and eventual
dissolution in 394 A.D.9 Further proof that sport is a microcosm of
society is found in the recent incidents involving drugs in sport, racism
among athletes and an obvious indication that the sports establishment is quite capable of defying the public interest.1 0
B. Clarificationof Shared Goals
While the introduction of a common enemy, or the creation in

vacuo of organizational goals, may stimulate efforts to overcome
intergroup conflicts, these conflicts are most readily surmounted by a
concurrence among the participants regarding superordinate problems
and goals. The perceived necessity of attaining these goals and of

overcoming these problems will encourage the growth of communication, leader contacts and, ultimately, attitude changes.
One recent study'1 of socializing behavior in a summer sports
camp, frighteningly suggestive of Golding's classic, Lord of the Flies, is
illustrative of this sharing effect. The camp was first fragmented into
mutually hostile groups by the artificial kindling of interpersonal
conflict. To resolve this conflict, several conventional techniques were
initially employed, including mutual information gathering, intergroup
leadership conferences and negotiation, the introduction of a common
enemy (which proved temporarily productive) and limited mutual

complex, multi-dimensional activity which earlier helped man to relate to his
social and cultural environment, to a simple but extremely specialized activity
which affords him greater and greater control over a small and, in itself
insignificant, area of experience." Csikszentmihalyi, The Rigors of Play, 208 THE
NATION 210, 212 (1969).

9. See Paleologos, Causes of the Decadence of the Ancient Games, 48
OLYMPIC REV. 475 (1971).

10. Rather than being a romantically inspired panacea for the world's ills or
an escape from them, the "plain truth is that sport is reflection of the society,
that it is human life in microcosm, that it has within it the maladies of the society,
that some athletes do drink, that some athletes do take drugs, that there is racism
in sport, that the sports establishment is quite capable of defying the public
interest, and that in this contemporary civilization sport does invade sociology,
economics, law and politics." Cosell, Sports and Good-by to All That, N.Y. Times,
April 5, 1971, at 33, col. 1.
11. M.

SHERIF, IN

COMMON PREDICAMENT: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1966).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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contacts and communication. Having achieved little success thereby,
the experimenters then created conditions for the emergence of
superordinate goals; these staged conditions included an imminent
camp-wide water shortage and the stalling of a truck en route to a vital
food distribution point. The resulting forced cooperation among
previously hostile groups developed intergroup ties and interpersonal
attitude changes. Once this harmony was achieved, it continued even
without the presence of shared problems.' 2
The results of this experiment appear to support the hypotheses of
scholars concerning functional cooperation on an international plane:
that transnational cooperation in resolving superordinate problems
leads to persistent patterns of cooperation among participating
nations.'" The integration or convergence of policies and values

among decision-makers within the International Labor Organization is
an excellent example. This organization advantageously harnesses the
competition and frequent political conflict between divergent
interests. Through a dynamic process of interaction, "certain kinds of
organizational tasks most intimately related to groups and national
aspirations can be expected to result in integration even though the
actors responsible for this development may not deliberately work
4
toward such an end.'1
What, then, are the implications for this article of the importance
to social integration of superordinate group goals? The earlier
discussion about the fundamentally associational, as opposed to
cooperative, nature of intergroup athletic activity raises a serious
question about the relevance of such goals. The response by an
association of opposing participants to what is essentially an

12. Focusing on a much higher and more complex level of social interaction,
recent legal scholarship has reflected an interest in problem-oriented premises of
global integration that transcend available nation-state machinery. See, e.g., R.A.
FALK, THIS ENDANGERED

PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR

(1971); Lasswell, InternationalLawyers and Scientists as
Agents and Counter Agents of World Public Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 366
(Proceedings) (1971) (address delivered at the American Society of International
Law Annual Dinner, April 30, 1971).
HUMAN SURVIVAL

13. D. MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (Quadrangle ed. 1966);
Mitrany, The FunctionalApproach in HistoricalPerspective, 47 INT'L AFFAIRS
532 (1971). The assumption that international cooperation in non-political
activities leads to cooperation in political activities was recommended for
reexamination by the 1965 White House Conference on International Cooperation. Report of the Committee on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 1, 1965.
14. E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 35 (1964).

Winter 1971
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equilibrium, is not extrinsically rewarding or materially productive,
but rather is conditioned upon intrinsic, individual satisfactions. Rewards within the Olympic context are often unshared. They are either
intangible or, when tangible, they are individualized; for example,
winners receive special medals, and all participants receive commendation medals. Therefore, if the intergroup association carries with it little
potential for the emergence of mutual rewards and the resolution of
common problems, then the chance is small that superordinate goals
can simply emerge, as in the summer camp experiment.
It is similarly unlikely that articulated goals that are designed to
provide a fundamental symbolic reference, as with the standards set
by the International Labor Organization, will produce cooperation
among competing athletes and athletic organizations. Sports competition is not only a form of conflict unrelated to the performance of
productive tasks, but also a highly artificial and regulated form with
prescribed limits of outcome and a fixed order. Only if the system
itself were to be jeopardized would mutual, superordinate goals
become important. Occasionally, relations between nations with teams
engaged in athletic competition are, indeed, strained to the breaking
point and existing patterns of athletic competition are thereby
jeopardized, such as in the Central American soccer war. As the

Olympic experience instructs us, however, systemic breakdown
generally is not likely in pseudo-events that are rooted in configurations of artificially induced and rationally controlled encounters.
Hence, decision-making within the Olympic model is usually concerned not with the achievement of goals that transcend the system
and potentially encourage cooperation, but rather with more modest
shared goals for the maintenance of an equilibrium in which
association may occur. And yet, four principal Olympic goals,
expressed in rule 3 of the Olympic Rules and Regulations, indicate
higher, superordinate purposes while relating primarily to this maintenance of equilibrium:
The aims of the Olympic Movement are [1] to promote the development of
those fine physical and moral qualities which are the basis of amateur sport
and [2] to bring together the athletes of the world in a great quadrennial
festival of sports thereby creating international respect and goodwill and
[3] thus helping to construct a better and [4] more peaceful world. 15

15. Rule 3, OLYMPIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 11 (1971) [hereinafter
Rules are cited as RULE with reference to enumerated rule or regulation, not
page; for citation to Eligibility Code see infra note 17].
Vol. 5-No. 1
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In considering the role of established norms and law in the process
of achieving these goals, it is useful to note three bases which have
been used to justify a permanent, authoritative, domestic intervention
into sports competition. These are, first, the amelioration of the
physical condition of the population; second, the safeguarding of the
public order; and third, the affirmation of national prestige 6 On the
international plane, similarly, there are arrangements which address
these same aims. These arrangements include, respectively, international controls over the conduct of boxing matches and the use of
stimulants and drugs;' I the encouragement of transnational track and
field contests which, in turn, have generated mass physical training
programs; and bilateral agreements, often based upon FNC treaties, to
stimulate joint international sports rivalry with third states.' 8
In promoting the goals expressed in rule 3, the Olympic model
assumes the first two of these three bases for legal implementation and
explicitly rejects the third in favor of a denationalization of
competition. In addition, a fourth basis for legal implementation,
which might be seen to encompass the first three, is introduced: the
promotion of more comprehensive, external goals, such as the
protection of human rights through the interaction of competitive
sports. This basis for legal implementation can be related to the goal
of "helping to construct a better. .. world."' +

16. J. MEYNAUD, supra note 1, at 126-27.
17. See, e.g., Eligibility Code, OLYMPIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 47
(1971) (prohibition against the use of drugs) [hereinafter the Eligibility Code is
cited as OLYMPIc ELIGIBILITY CODE with reference to page]; Constant,
Belgian Legislation Against the Use of Drugs in Sport, 19 N. IR.L.Q. 160 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Agreement between the German Association for Gymnastics
and Sports (DTSB) of East Germany and the Main Committee for Physical
Culture and Sports of Poland, based on a 1967 FNC treaty between the two
countries and directed against West Germany. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance between the German Democratic Republic and the People's
Republic of Poland, 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 514 (1967), ratificationnoted
6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 862 (1967). Article 2 of the agreement reads: "In
this spirit, both sides will come out for a strict observation of the principles of
mutual respect, recognition, and equal rights; they will oppose all forms of
discrimination in international sports and fight for the adherence to the statutes
and rules of the international sports organizations." For recent examples of the
importance of Olympic sports participation to national prestige see, Moscow's
Olympic Dialogue, SPORT IN THE U.S.S.R., No. 4 (1970); Olympic Ideas Put
into Practice, 10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BULL. 219 (1970) (published by the Press
and Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German
Democratic Republic).
19. RULE 3, supra note 15.
Winter 1971
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After briefly examining the structure and characteristics of the
Olympic model, this article will consider its performance in response
to four current situations, each of which relates to one of the four
basic goals of the Olympic movement articulated in rule 3 and each
of which affords a study of one or more of the corresponding bases
for legal implementation. The situations to be considered are
"creeping professionalism"; the politicization of competition by
nations; the "ping-pong diplomacy" of China especially as it bears on
the conduct of the Olympic Games; and the conflict between the
apartheid practices of South Africa and the Olympic rules, as officially
interpreted.

II.

STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF OLYMPIC DECISION-MAKING

A. The InstitutionalStructure
The 1894 Congress of Paris launched the modem Olympic Games
and established a permanent International Olympic Committee
(I.O.C.) which is "the final authority on all questions concerning the
Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement." 2
Specifically, it is
responsible principally for creating rules and regulations applicable to
Olympic decision-making, electing its own officers and chairmen of
certain committees, determining the qualifications of Olympic participants and selecting a site for each Olympiad.2" According to one
classification of non-governmental organizations, the I.O.C. is a
"cosmopolitan" organization-that is, one composed of individuals
rather than nation-states or organizational representatives. 2 2 The
I.O.C., together with several other bodies, forms an Olympic organization which includes individual, national and international members.
The I.O.C. is unique in coopting its membership not on the basis
of their representation from, but rather to, other organizations-name23
ly, to officially recognized national federations and committees.
Before elaborating further on the characteristics of the I.O.C.'s
membership, let us look briefly at the remaining institutional structure
of the Olympic organization.
An Executive Board, composed of the President, three Vice-Presidents, and five additional members, performs ministerial duties

20. RULE 23, supra note 15.
21. RULE 4, 13, 14 & 34, supra note 15.
22. L.C. WHITE, THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 34 (1933). See generally id. at 244-48; L.C. WHITE,
INTERNATIONAL
NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS:
PURPOSES, METHODS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 199-200 (1951).

23.

RULE 11, supra note 15.

Vol. 5-No. 1
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assigned to it by the I.O.C.24 Administrative support is provided by
an efficient secretariat, located in Lausanne, Switzerland. 2" Income is
derived from the annual subscriptions of the I.O.C. itself. Technical
control over the conduct of sports competition is given to the 26
authorized international federations, each of which employs technical
rules to govern a particular official sport.2 6 For example, the
International Amateur Athletic Federation, the body with responsibility for rule-making, supervision, control and development
in respect to track and field competitions, announced in early 1971 its
own new qualifying standards for the 1972 Games in order to reflect
"the bettering of world standards in both track and field events." 2 7
The international federations also regulate the number of entrants in
each sport within limits set by the I.O.C., the equipment standards
and controls, the selection of judges and the exercise of what could
be described as limited appellate jurisdiction. Municipal components
of the international federations are called national federations. Five of
these components constitute a national Olympic committee. 2" The
authority and role of the national Olympic committees in Olympic
decision-making 2 9 are comparable to those of the National Red Cross
Societies in relation to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
All I.O.C. rules and regulations must be adopted and enforced by the
national committees through their own rules and regulations.' 0 Two
delegates from each of the international federations and national
committees are invited from time to time to confer on a consultative
basis with the Executive Board of the I.O.C."' Occasionally, an
Olympic Congress is convened, which for discussion and planning
purposes brings together the I.O.C., and representatives from the
international federations and the national committees.
24. The Executive Board is assigned the responsibility for observation of the
Rules and Regulations, the preparation of an agenda for meetings of the I.O.C.,
the nomination of members of the I.O.C., the management of the LO.C.'s
finances, the preparation of its annual report, the appointment of its Director, the
ultimate responsibility for its administration and the maintenance of its records.
RULE 15, supra note 15.
25. RULE 22, supra note 15.
26. RULE 46, supra note 15.
27. See Announcement of the International Amateur Athletic Federation
(IAAF), April 4, 1971 (published in London). The IAAF's decision, inter alia,
raised the pole vault minimum to 16 feet 8 3/4 inches and the mens' high jump to
7 feet.
28. RULE 24, supra note 15.
29. RULE 24, 25, supra note 15.
30. RULE 24, supra note 15.

31. RULE 17, supra note 15.
Winter 1971
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B. The Participantsand Their Perspectives
Participants in the Olympic process include the individual competitors, whose average age in the 1968 Olympics ranged from 17.6
(women swimmers) to 32.5 (men rifle shooters);3 2 nations; and the
officially designated decision-making institutions and individuals
within the Olympic institutional apparatus. The individual

competitors are selected during try-outs by the national Olympic
committees. These athletes play only a minor role in formal
decision-making but are instrumental in shaping, sharing and promoting the goals of the system.
Recruitment of the primary decision-makers, the I.O.C. members,
is conducted by that body itself according to several criteria: facility
in French or English, citizenship and residency in a country with a
national Olympic committee, and independence from binding instructions from any individual, organization, or sovereign government.3 3 It is provided that "there shall be only one member in any
country except in the largest and most active in the Olympic
Movement, and in the countries where the Olympic Games have been
held, where there may be two." ' 34 The President of the I.O.C. is
elected for an eight-year term by absolute majority, by a secret ballot,
and is eligible for reelection for successive four-year terms. 35 The
remaining members of an Executive Board are elected for four-year
terms.
The I.O.C. has been criticized frequently because its membership
appears to be based upon wealth, elitism, age and geographical
non-representation. 36 The I.O.C. for long has been identified with
Western Europe; it has had, for example, only three members from
sub-Saharan Africa, one of whom was an aristocratic Englishman from
Kenya. In addition, the amount of power and prerogative formally
accorded the office of the President has been especially criticized.3 7
Without evaluating such criticism, it should be noted that the three
newest members of the I.O.C. are from Ethiopia, Thailand, and the
U.S.S.R., 3 8 and that the President's discretion is increasingly subject

to the application of the organizational rules.
32. 38, 39
33.

OLYMPIC REV.

11, supra note
34.
13, supra note
35.
13, supra note
36. On the perspectives
RULE
RULE
RULE

(1979).

15.

15.
15.
of the incumbent president, see Brundage, The

Olympic Movement: Objectives and Achievements, 3 GYMNASION 3 (1966).

37. See, e.g., J. MEYNAUD, supra note 1, at 105.
38. I.O.C., REPORT ON THE 71ST SESSION (SEPT. 15-17, 1971)
MEETING OF EXECUTIVE BOARD (SEPT.
[hereinafter cited as I.O.C., REPORT].

Vol. 5-No. 1
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Several rules and regulations would seem to encourage the
traditional pattern of membership on the I.O.C.: members are coopted
and must be free of governmental and private influence, and who but
the rich, it is argued, can be free of such influence; they are elected for
life, although rule 12(2) now requires retirement at age 72 of members
elected after 1965; one of the three Vice-Presidents must be a
European; past host countries are entitled to double membership; and
the size of the I.O.C. is restricted, despite the growth in the number of
national committees. 3 9
The I.O.C., its Executive Board, and particularly its President,
have been given great discretionary powers in the administration of
the Olympic Games by the international federations, national committees, and responsible individuals. For example, the President may
take action or make a decision subject to later ratification by the
I.O.C. when "circumstances" do not permit such action to be taken
by the I.O.C. or its Executive Board.4 Moreover, the continuing
practice of the Olympic organization to keep its deliberations secret
and unpublished, except in summary form, serves to protect the
freedom of discretion in decision-making. However, the trend in
recent years seems to have been away from discretionary administration by a narrowly representative "clique" of gentlemen toward a
rule-oriented administration by a more widely representative I.O.C.
Only the pace of this transformation is controversial.
C. Legal Tools of Regulation
Legal tools available to the Olympic organization include the
technical rules governing competition within each sport, to which
reference has been made and about which this article is not primarily
concerned; and the organizational rules, about which this article is
primarily concerned. The Charter of the Olympic Games and various
ministerial and protocol provisions form a document entitled Olympic
Rules and Regulations,4 1 which includes the organizational rules,
together with an Eligibility Code and "decisions" made under it. The
document is a curious composite of "basic law" provisions, rules,

39. See RULE 11, supra note 15.
40. RULE 16, supra note 15. The President is authorized to name the time
and place of I.O.C. meetings, although he must convoke a meeting upon the
request of one-third of the membership. He settles all "procedural" questions and
exercises independent discretion at I.O.C. sessions in deciding whether or not to
entertain new action not indicated by the agenda. RULE 17, 18 & 19, supra note
15.
41. See note 15 supra.
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norms and a few admonitions. In style, it is rather loosely written and
presents several conflicts of language between the English and French
versions. In addition, it contains several spelling and grammatical
errors.4 2 Proposals for changes in the rules are referred to a
Legislation Commission which drafts revisions for submission to and
adoption by the I.O.C.
Under the rules, technical disputes, such as disqualifications,
timekeeping and the like, are settled by a jury for each sport. The jury
is appointed by the appropriate international federation. The jury's
decisions are final.4 3 All controversies of a non-technical nature must
be submitted to the I.O.C. Executive Board by a national committee,
an international federation or the organizing committee of the city
where the games are being held.4 4 Violations under rule 26, which
governs eligibility, until recently were handled under the provisions of
the Eligibility Code and referred to a special committee of the
Executive Board "for investigation and report with a view to
action."4" It is unclear what action could properly be taken. The
single sanction seems to be disqualification, either of an individual or a
team, depending upon the circumstances. 4 6 As will be noted later,4
the enforcement machinery was changed in 1971, but the question of
available or contemplated sanctions persists.
Rule-creation and rule-supervision within the Olympic arena are
shared by the international federations, which also deal with technical
matters; the national committees; and the I.O.C. The nature of the
legal tools available to both recognized and non-recognized international athletic federations varies; but in general, the devices are
better defined and more penetrating than those available to the I.O.C.
For example, the International Federation of Motor Cyclists, a
non-recognized federation, proceeds according to a code containing a
defined hierarchy of sanctions for rule infractions, e.g., reprimand,

42. E.g., "[The] Olympiad and Games are numbered consecutively from
[1896], even though it has been impossible to hold the Games in any [sic]
Olympiad." RULE 2, supra note 15 (emphasis added). See generally RULE 15, at
line 12 & RULE 54, supra note 15; OLYMPIC ELIGIBILITY CODE, supra note
17. The punctuation and wording of rule 45 was improved during the September,
1971 meeting of the I.O.C. In case of discrepancy between the French and English
text, the French text prevails. RULE 19, supra note 15.
43. RULE 40, supra note 15.
44. RULE 41, supra note 15.
45. OLYMPic ELIGIBILITY CODE,supra note 17, at 44.
46. RULE 42, supra note 15.
47. See Part I.A. of this article infra.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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apology, suspension and exclusion. Similarly, the code of the
International Association of Recognized Automobile Clubs imposes
standards on automobile manufacturers of racing vehicles in international competition; this feature is reputedly "one of the principal
48
causes of automobile progress."
Im. CASE STUDIES

A. CreepingProfessionalism
"to promote the development of those fine physical4 9and moral qualities
which are the basis of amateur sport"

The Olympic Games subordinate universal participation to the
above expressed goal.' 0 Thus, all participants must be "amateur,""
as interpreted by rule 26 of the Olympic Rules, which governs
eligibility. Until April, 1971, rule 26 read:
To be eligible for the Olympic Games a competitor must always have
participated in sport as an avocation without material gain of any kind. He
can avail himself of this qualification: a) if he has a basic occupation
designed to ensure his present and future livelihood; b) if he does not
receive or has never received any remuneration for participation in sport; c)

if he complies with the rules of the International Federation concerned, and
the official interpretations of this rule (see Eligibility Code).
As indicated, an Eligibility Code was adopted as a means of
interpreting these provisions. In general, it barred eligible amateurs
from accepting any compensation, other than limited expense money,

48. L.C.
ZATIONS:
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THEIR PURPOSES,

NON-GOVERNMENTAL

METHODS,

AND

ORGANI-

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

199

(1951).
49. RULE 3, supra note 15.
50. One writer has summarized the several leading theoretical commentaries
on the developmental value of athletics as follows: "(Barnes and Ruedi) Spencer
held that play was needed to get rid of surplus energy. Tarde pointed out the role
of imitation in play. Lazarus felt play was 'recreative' and a means of recovering
from fatigue. Groos held that play was preparation for adult life. Appleton
assigned to play a physical basis and associated it with bodily changes occurring
during growth. Hall developed the 'Recapitulation Theory' in which play was
viewed as a reliving of our savage ancestral activities. Shand saw play as expressing
joy. McDougall felt play was motivated by the instinct of rivalry. Adler held play
was used to overcome inferiority complexes." Daniels, The Study of Sport as an
Element of the Culture, 1 INT'L REV. OF SPORT SOCIOLOGY 153, 157
(1966).
51. RULE 1 & 26, supra note 15.
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which might be attributable to their athletic activity or status. 2 This
prohibition extended to receiving compensation for playing, teaching
or coaching competitive sports and making promotional endorsements
or appearances. The athlete could neither use his fame to obtain a job
nor interrupt his job or studies for more than four weeks of training in
a camp per year. Eligibility "decisions" by the I.O.C. interpreted these
rules strictly. For instance, individuals subsidized because of their
athletic ability by governments, institutions or business concerns were
5
held not to be amateurs. 3
The Eligibility Code was useful up to a point. But by 1971, fed by
demands for greater precision in response to individual cases, the Code
had become a rather baroque and disorganized framework for decision
making. Moreover, it was an interpretative device, not a set of binding
52. Any athlete was disqualified who, without permission of the appropriate
national federation, accepted any prize worth $50 or more; had capitalized on or
secured employment promotion on the basis of athletic fame or success; became a
professional in any sport or had decided to become one or played in a professional
team with a view to become a professional; had been paid for teaching or coaching
others for competition in sport; had been awarded a scholarship mainly for his
athletic ability; had demanded payment or expense money for a manager, coach,
relative or friend; had received payment of expenses in excess of the actual outlay,
although he might receive clothing and equipment in addition to reimbursement
of expenses or "pocket money to cover petty daily expenses during the Games;"
interrupted his occupation, studies or employment for special training in a camp
for more than four weeks in any one calendar year; had received expense money
for more than 30 days exclusive of the time spent in travelling in any one calendar
year; had neglected his usual vocation or employment for competitive sport
whether at home or abroad; or was paid for the use of his name or picture or for a
radio or television appearance. OLYMPIC ELIGIBILITY CODE, supra note 17, at
44-46.
53. "Business and industrial concerns sometimes employ athletes for their
advertising value. The athletes are given paid employment with little work to do
and are free to practice and compete at all times. For national aggrandizement,
governments occasionally adopt the same methods and give athletes positions in
the Army, on the police force or in a government office. They also operate
training camps for extended periods. Some colleges and universities offer
outstanding athletes scholarships and inducements of various kinds. Recipients of
these special favors which are granted only because of athletic ability are not
eligible to compete in the Olympic Games." OLYMPIC ELIGIBILITY CODE,
supra note 17, at 48. However, "An athlete paid for teaching elementary sport
(beginners or school-children) on a temporary basis without abandoning his usual
occupation remains eligible. An athlete may be a full time professional journalist,
radio or television reporter or a full time manager of or worker in an athletic
facility without forfeiting his amateur status." OLYMPIC ELIGIBILITY CODE,
supra note 17, at 47.
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rules. Ranging from overly detailed provisions to "ball-park" size
injunctions, the Code's provisions offered little legal support to the
principle of amateur participation.
In April, 1971, the I.O.C. adopted a new rule 26.5 4 It provides a
clarified, streamlined and better focused restatement of the pre-1971
Eligibility Code. Moreover, it is binding on the participants. The Code
itself was reduced to four matters: the use of dope; the participation
of women, a matter to be revised later and incorporated into rule
27; penalties in the case of fraud; and non-amateurs and semiprofessionals. The incorpqration of most of the Code into rule 26
represents another step in the gradual transformation of the I.O.C.
into a rule-creating and rule-enforcing organization.
More important than the rephrasing and editing of the bulk of the
Eligibility Code, as incorporated into rule 26, were the several
substantive modifications. The subjective "intent to become a
professional" provision and the even more subjective "neglect of usual
employment" provisions were eliminated; physical education teachers
of beginners became eligible without qualification as to the extent of
the teaching or the existence of another occupation; the definition of

acceptable assistance was broadened to include prizes without dollar
limit, insurance related to training, medical care, and sports equipment; scholarships to athletes became acceptable when awarded on
the basis of "academic and technical" standards; and the recognized
period for full-time training was extended from 30 to 60 days in one
calendar year. In general, the new rule 26, though strict, is responsive
to changing conditions.
Most important were three new "directives." One of these appears
to limit the advertising prohibition to those cases where an athlete
permits his name, photograph, or sports performance to be used
"individually" for advertising purposes. A second directive permits
athletes to associate themselves or their names with the mass media
during the Olympic Games, subject to the approval of their chefs de
mission. The third directive provides that, subject to certain controls,
advertising is permitted that results from equipment contracts entered
into by the national federations.
Finally, a flexible enforcement mechanism is provided in the form
of a commission which was established to "consult and cooperate"
with the international federations and the national Olympic committees."5 The old provision had provided for a more formal
54. See 43 OLYMPIC REV. 202 (1971).
55. The Commission was appointed on November 23, 1971, to serve
primarily as a watchdog over the national Olympic committees. N.Y. Times, Nov.
24, 1971, § C, at 42, col. 2.
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investigatory committee that proved weak because it did not involve
the federations and committees in the enforcement process.
To understand the reasons for these modifications of rule 26, we
must examine the background and recent history of the "amateur"
requirement. Fundamentally, it is the product of the times and
personal philosophy of the founder of the modern Olympic Games,
Baron de Coubertin. The amateur requirement marked a sharp
departure from the practice of the ancient Greek Olympics, whose
participants were state-supported and had official status. Arising when
organized sports were thought of principally as activities of "gentlemen," the protection of the amateur character of the Olympics has
continued to appeal not only to those genuinely concerned about the
encouragement of mass participation in athletics, but also to those
who favor a perpetuation of elitism. To them, professionalism is
"entertainment"-only amateurism is "sport." Recent developments,
however, have tended to undermine the concept of amateurism: there
has been an emerging pattern of correspondence between athletic
status and closely related professional endeavor, such as physical
education teaching; temptation in the form of increasing advertising
money has grown in proportion to the expansion of the sports
equipment industry; and finally, an increased interest by the spectator
public in, and its demand for, higher levels of performance has
required amateurs to devote increased amounts of time to training and
dry-runs.1 6 Nevertheless, unlike other sports organizations, such as
the British Lawn Tennis Association, which have removed the
distinction between "professional" and "amateur," the Olympic rule
has not only remained on the books but the pre-1971 Eligibility Code
had become more and more elaborate in response to specific claims
that it was flagrantly breached. For this reason, the rule was becoming
not only hypocritical, but probably dysfunctional. For example, in
Africa a good "amateur" athlete is often a police inspector or an army
lieutenant who may spend 90 per cent of his time in training. In
Scandinavia, an Olympic bound cross-country skier is often a customs
official who can devote much of his time to training. In the Soviet
Union, athletes are state supported; and in the United States, top
"amateur" college athletes typically receive compensation in the form
of all-inclusive scholarships.
The ineffectiveness of the old rule 26 and Code provisions was
seen in the dispute over the wisdom and legality of permitting
Olympic participants to receive money for releasing their image or
name for advertising purposes. Rule 34 provides that "no commercial

56. See generally J. MEYNAUD, supra note 1, at 144-49.
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advertising is permitted on equipment used in the Games nor on the
uniforms or numbers worn by contestants or officials." Enforcement
is provided by rule 54:
The display of any clothing or equipment such as shoes, skis [,j handbags,
hats, etc. marked conspicuously for advertising purposes in any Olympic
venue (training grounds, Olympic Village, or fields of competition), by
participants[,] either competitors, coaches trainers, or anyone else
associated with an Olympic team in [an] official capacity, will normally
result in immediate disqualification or withdrawal of credentials.
Rules 34 and 54 cover the athletes during the Games only. Rule 26
and the Eligibility Code had to be invoked to determine initial
eligibility of competitors for the Olympic competition. Apparently
ignoring the limited enforcement machinery available to him under
the Eligibility Code, the President of the I.O.C. took the highly
unusual step in 1971 of proposing the elimination of alpine skiing
from the 1972 Winter Olympics because of numerous incidents
involving the remuneration of alpine skiers by ski equipment
manufacturers. Acting primarily in response to the President's threat,
the I.O.C. Executive Board, meeting March 13-14, 1971, unanimously
approved the text of the revised rule 26, which was subsequently
adopted by the I.O.C. As we have seen, the new rule considerably
relaxes restraints on monetary inducements, while at the same time
retaining a dichotomy between amateurs and professionals. The rule
is, of course, applicable to the eligibility of all athletes, but was
intended immediately to resolve the alpine skiing crisis by means of

the directive that bars any athlete who has "directly or indirectly
allowed his name, his photograph or his sports performance to be used
individually for advertising purposes." 5 7 Because of the lack of
enforcement machinery within the Olympic apparatus, aside from the
consultative commission; the importance to the Winter Olympics of
alpine skiing, which represents about 50 per cent of all events; and the
Japanese investment of an estimated $20 million in preparation of the
1972 site, the authority of rule 26 was put to a severe early test.
Despite the customary precedence of Olympic rules over conflicting
decisions by the international federations, the real efficacy of the new
rule depended on its acceptance by the international ski federation,
Federation Internationale de Ski (F.I.S.), whose first response was to
threaten a boycott of the 1972 Winter Games.' 8 The conflict between

57. Washington Post, March 27, 1971, § E, at 3, col. 3.
58. As this article was going to press in February, 1972, the author was able to
summarize the resolution of this conflict as of the beginning of the 1972 Winter
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the F.I.S. and the I.O.C. is noteworthy because it arose out of a direct

clash between the new Olympic rule and a recently revised and far
Olympic Games. Briefly, the boycott was never undertaken and to a limited
extent rule 26 prevailed. One important national committee implemented rule 26
be expelling several top skiers although the general reaction to rule 26 remained
mixed and the threat of a boycott persisted. Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1971, §
D, at 5, col. 3. The I.O.C. warned the national committees that they risked the
disqualification of entire teams if they should nominate individual entries who
were later found to have violated rule 26. Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1972, § C, at
3, col. 4. Shortly before the 1972 Winter Olympics, the F.I.S., ostensibly out of
deference to the Japanese Organizing Committee, dropped its plans to boycott the
Games with the qualification that if the I.O.C. did not accept its "good faith"
interpretation of the rules it would not recognize the Olympics as the world
championships. Also on the eve of the Games, a four man eligibility commission,
established under the new rule and chaired by Hugh Weir of Australia, reviewed
evidence of individual rule 26 violations that had been submitted to it from
several quarters, primarily from the I.O.C. President. Washington Post, Jan. 28,
1972, § F, at 4, col. 5. The I.O.C. President remained firm in asserting his
conviction that many skiers were "trained seals," captive of the ski equipment
industry. Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1972, § K, at 8, col. 1.
The evidence presented to the Weir Commission included the testimony of
several athletes, including an East German refugee who charged the East German
Government with encouraging "state amateurism" in violation of rule 26 by
providing successful athletes with handsome cash bonuses, higher salaries, priority
in military promotions and special housing and automobile allocations. Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1972, § F, at 4, col. 6. Aside from such testimony, the evidence
was limited apparently to scattered clippings of advertisements from newspapers
and periodicals. This evidence, however, was found to be unacceptable by both
the eligibility commission and the Executive Board. Moreover, the commission

refused to apply rule 26 retroactively prior to April 2, 1971, when it went into
force and before which many of the alleged violations had occurred. In doing so,
the commission clearly distinguished the ineffectiveness of the old code provisions
from the effectiveness of the new rule 26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, at 22, col.
5; Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1972, § E, at 1, col. 4. After deciding these
procedural questions, the Weir Commission reported its somewhat surprising
recommendation to the I.O.C. that only one athlete, Karl Schranz of Austria, be
disqualified for violations of rule 26. The commission's report was adopted by the
I.O.C. after a two hour debate. Mr. Schranz was excluded from the 1972
Olympics and all threats of boycott by several national committees fizzled upon
the decision of the Austrian National Committee to participate in the Games. The
feeling remained in the Austrian Committee, however, that Mr. Schranz was
"singled-out" and excluded because of his candidness and militancy in opposing
both the I.O.C. President and the application of rule 26 by the President and the
I.O.C. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1972, at 43, col. 6.
The resolution of the amateur standing crisis on the eve of the 1972 Winter
Games was accomplished politically by the last minute cooperation of the F.I.S.,
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more liberal rule of the F.I.S.5 9 Ironically, the F.I.S. rule might be
given some force by a provision in the new rule 26 that "[a]
competitor must observe and abide by the Rules of the International
Federation that controls the sport in which he participates, even if
these Rules should be stricter than those imposed by the International
Olympic Committee." Although the intent of the provision was no
doubt to further fortify resistance to creeping professionalism, a literal
reading would seem to upset the customary precedence of the
Olympic rules. A subsequent provision, however, may rescue the
presumption favoring Olympic regulation whenever a rule of an
international federation, such as the F.I.S., is weaker than rule 26:
"[the competitor] must comply with his Federation's directives and
those issued by the International Olympic Committee." Thus, it
would seem that, to comply with the latter provision, a prospective
competitor would have to observe the stricter of two conflicting
provisions, in this case the I.O.C. directives.
The new enforcement machinery, which is established by rule and
emphasizes consultation and conciliation, rather than formal quasiadjudication, offers hope for a resolution of this conflict despite the

and legally by the application of the new rule 26, together with a skillful
treatment of evidence that had been submitted to the Weir Commission. In
predicting the continuing vitality of rule 26, it is important to recognize that its
application may have been restricted in context of the skiing crisis to a single,
notorious violation of rule 26 as a sort of expedient that may preserve it for a
time but cannot often be repeated without disparaging the due process,
objectivity and equal protection afforded by Olympic decision-making, and
thereby damaging the organization's legitimacy. With an eye to the future, a few
final observations may be cogent: in resolving the dispute, which had clearly
challenged the integrity of the entire Olympic organization, the I.O.C. and its
eligibility commission, though acting reasonably, proceeded without granting a
hearing to either Mr. Schranz or to any of the others accused of violating rule 26;
nor was its decision adequately subjected to the appellate process. On the other
hand, the prosecutorial process seems to have been handicapped by the I.O.C.'s
lack of policing authority and capability in gathering evidence, a lack of
cooperation from the national committees and a consensus that a lawsuit for
perjury in sports is inappropriate. Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1972, § K, at 8, col.
1. These are the types of problems that characterize most transnational
organizations; they are nevertheless problems that deserve serious and sustained
attention. Perhaps the 1973 Olympic Congress in Sofia would provide one
appropriate forum for discussion of such matters. See note 97 infra.
59. This rule allows compensation for the loss of income during training,
open competition between amateurs and professionals, more liberal compensation
for travel accommodations and insurance coverage. Washington Post, June 12,
1971, § D, at 6, col. 2.
Winter 1971

TRANSNA TIONAL SPORTS COMPETITION

initial reaction of the F.I.S. Such dilemmas could, of course, be
avoided if the I.O.C. interpreted its rules as prohibiting the commercialization of only the actual sports competition, not the
non-competitive aspects of sport.6" This would not, however,
eliminate fundamental differences in philosophy such as that between
the I.O.C. and the F.I.S.
Although rule 26 appears to be resolving a major crisis, it is
unequivocally clear that the Olympic rules regarding amateur standing
have been honored more in their breach than in practice. Moreover,
the increasing complexity of the pre-1971 Code further weakened
their authority. Hopefully, the new rule will restore this authority. It
is apparent, however, that no evidence exists to support the notion
that the amateur requirement serves to encourage truly amateur
athletic participation. Thus, faced with growing professionalism

among the ranks of participants, the blurring of the dichotomy
between "amateur" and "professional" status, and the deteriorating
authority of the entire legal regime, the I.O.C. proved itself both
sensitive and sensible in revising rule 26. But further relaxation of its
strictures may be indicated. Aside from the establishment of a costly
monitoring system, the only alternative to the process of reshaping
rule 26 to meet changing conditions would appear to be either the
creation of two levels of competition, one for professionals and one
for amateurs in the modern sense, or the more direct and effective
remedy of complete elimination of the amateur requirement.
B. Sports and Minimum Public Order: The Nation-State
Politicizationof Competition
"to bring together the athletes of the world... thereby creating inter' 61
national respect and goodwill "
The symbolic importance of Olympic participation and success to
national prestige, which may serve to inject international politics into
the Olympic arena, suggests the need for responsive rules to safeguard
the public order by denationalizing the Games. 6 2 Mutual hostility
60. A decision of the I.O.C. under rule 26 permits the I.O.C. to make an
exception, so long as the "basic principles" are not infringed, that an athlete does
not "make a profit or livelihood out of his sport." Arguably the words "his sport"
might be construed to refer to a particular act of competition, rather than to his
image as an athlete; thus, profit related not to a specific sports event might be
considered beyond the reach of the provision. But the line is fine.
61. RULE 3, supra note 15.
62. "Participation" of nation-states in the Olympic Games as a political
technique, with its concomitant regimentation and exploitation of the athlete and
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between nations is often channeled into the pseudo-event of sports
competition, where, ironically, it may serve to create or exacerbate
political conflict.
The thousands of spectators, and sometime the players as well, seem to
behold a mighty contest between their 'country' and the 'enemy.' The
national prestige is at stake; a victory is no longer the success of the team
that could play better but becomes a national victory and is an occasion for
national rejoicings, out of all proportion 6with
reality. Such an attitude is not
3
favorable to international understanding.
Resulting tension may range from unfavorable propaganda and
diplomatic strain, as in the aftermath of the Swedish victory over
Germany in the 1962 World Soccer Championships, to the open
warfare of the 1969 "soccer war. ' 6' 4 Available data suggest that a
strong "reference group" relationship between two competing countries greatly enhances the possibility of such tension. Thus, rival
countries that habitually turn to each other for power cues are very
apt to experience the most serious mutual tension from sports
competition between their nationals.

The group dynamics of tension between "in-groups" and "outgroups" serve to establish patterns of identification which resist
otherwise transcending values. These group identifications, fed by
stereotyped national perceptions, are quickly exaggerated into ethnocentrism. Two other situational determinants, publicity and professionalism, also tend to produce an arousal of inter-group conflict,
and as victory becomes paramount, lead to a lessening of loyalty to
prescribed rules. 65 Only full adherence to the technical rules of fair
play and the internalization by participants of the organization goals
of respect and goodwill can overcome these situational determinants. 6
The competition itself may serve to create a measure of respect
and goodwill. Various sociological data and commentaries support the
insistence upon winning, dates back generally to the Berlin Olympics of 1936. J.
HOLMES, OLYMPIAD 1936 (1971); R.D. MANDELL, THE NAZI OLYMPICS
(1971).
63. Jones, Sport and International Understanding, REPORT OF THE
UNESCO-CONGRESS "SPORT-WORK-CULTURE" IN HELSINKI 1959, at
163 (1959), quoted in Heinili, supra note 6, at 33 & n.6.
64. See generally Documents Concerning Conflict Between El Salvador and
Honduras, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1079 (1969). These documents relate
to the serious ensuing crisis between El Salvador and Honduras and include
material relating to the action taken by the O.A.S.
65. HeinilN, supra note 6, at 35.
66. Heinilg, supra note 6, at 36-37.
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theoretical notion,6 7 implicit in the "Objects and Powers" provision
of rule 10(4),68 that well-organized athletic competition can generate
mutual contacts and confidences and decrease social distance among
participants.6 9 It has also been contended that athletes with recordbreaking aspirations lay more stress on personal and fellowship
relations than on more objective, competitive values. 7" There are
heroic instances of goodwill overcoming the compulsions of national
prestige in Olympic competition, as, for example, the crucial
assistance that was given to Jesse Owens by his chief competitor in the
broad jump in the politically-charged 1936 Olympics. In addition, the
rule-based nature of sports activity prevents individual and group
tensions from developing into more dangerous forms of power
conflict. Moreover, the individual nature of most events minimizes the
potentiality of conflict in the Olympic Games as compared with the
more volatile team-oriented contests, notwithstanding the tension
generated by any transnational competition, including the
Thus, within the Games, conflict can be controlled in
Olympics.'
such a way as to encourage a degree of associational comraderie during
the contests. Yet, on the whole, it is probable that beyond the
contests themselves transnational sports competition supports world
social integration no more than disintegration.7 2
67. See, e.g., Nieburg, supra note 4, at 66.
68. "[The I.O.C. is responsible for] inspiring, and leading sport within the
Olympic ideal, thereby promoting and strengthening friendship between the
sportsmen of all countries." RULE 10 (4), supra note 15.
69. See Bouet, The Function of Sport in Human Relations, 1 INT'L REV.
OF SPORT SOCIOLOGY 137,139 (1966).
70. See G. LUsCHEN, 2 DIE FREIZEIT DER ARBEITERSCHAFT UND
IHRE BEZIEHUNG ZUM SPORT (1962), noted in Hammerich, CriticalRemarks
Regarding the State of Sociological Research in the German FederalRepublic, 1
INT'L REV. OF SPORT SOCIOLOGY 229, 236 n. 51 (1966).
71. See, e.g., Heinilgi, supra note 6, at 33.
72. See Worl, Conception and Range of Sport Sociology, 1 INT'L REV. OF
SPORT SOCIOLOGY 5 (1966). The author of a history of the politically charged
1936 Games in Berlin concludes that they "seem to have contributed more to
international misunderstanding than to the peace of the world and the furtherance
of international sportsmanship." J. HOLMES, supra note 62, at 159. Two fiction
writers have echoed the notion that sports competition helps relieve interjurisdictional tensions. Albert Camus wrote, "And unable to lay seige to each
other, Oran and Algiers meet, compete, and insult each other on the field of
sports.... " A. CAMUS, "Sports" from The Minotaur in THE MYTH OF
SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 123 (Vintage Books ed. 1955). Agatha
Christie, too, wrote, "You know, I don't like the sound of Vietnam at all. It's all
very confusing, North Vietnam and South Vietnam and the Viet-Cong and the
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Although the Olympic Games are expressly "between individuals
and not between countries or areas, ' 7 3 the disintegrating influence of
nation-states cannot be avoided. 4 The mere presence of an element
as innocuous as a national flag has prompted controversy and
complaints over the creation of unnecessary international rivalry.
There is a danger of increased political pressure resulting from subtle
diplomatic ploys designed to pollute the non-political atmosphere of
Olympic competition. To the extent that such pressure is successful,
the world-ordering potential of the Games is correspondingly inhibited.
The interplay of nation-state politics and Olympic competition is,
of course, often not so much a result of the sports competition, itself,
as it is of external factors. It is obvious, first, that established patterns
of political rivalry and conflict can enhance the possibility of
unprescribed conflict in the sports arena. An example is the outbreak
centering on the Honduras-El Salvador soccer match. Sometimes
exclusionary municipal law stimulates controversy and poses conflicts
between Olympic decisions and municipal law. One such conflict
concerns the policy of state recognition pursued by participating
countries. Rule 7 provides for recognition by a national Olympic
committee when a "country or area [has] had a stable government for

Viet-whatever the other thing is and all wanting each other and nobody wanting
to stop. They won't go to Paris or wherever it is and sit round tables and talk
sensible ....I've been thinking it over and I thought it would be a very nice
solution-couldn't you make a lot of football fields and then they could all go and
fight each other there, but with less lethal weapons. Not that nasty palm burning
stuff. You know. Just hit each other and punch each other and all that. They'd
enjoy it, everyone would enjoy it and you could charge admission for people to go
and see them do it. I do think really that we don't understand giving people the
things they really want." A. CHRISTIE, PASSENGER TO FRANKFURT 50-51
(1970).
73. RULE 8, supra note 15. "Governments cannot designate members of
National Olympic Committees." RULE 24, supra note 15. "[The] Olympics are
not contests between nations and no scoring by countries is recognized." RULE
44, supra note 15. Further, a decision of the I.O.C. considered it "dangerous to
the Olympic ideals, that, besides the proper development of sports in accordance
with the principles of amateurism, certain tendencies exist which aim primarily at
a national exaltation of the results gained instead of the realization that the
sharing of friendly effort and rivalry is the essential aim of the Olympic Games."
OLYMPIC ELIGIBILITY CODE, supra note 17, at 48. The President reiterated
the importance of the Olympic Movement's independence from governments at
the I.O.C. September, 1971 meetings. I.O.C., REPORT, supra note 38, at 13.
74. The use of national anthems and flags at appropriate ceremonial times
during the Games, authorized by rules 56, 57, 58 and 59, has proven to be
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a reasonable period." Disparities between applications of this criterion
and the application by nation-states of other recognition policies have
proved troublesome. Thus, although Australia did not recognize the
Soviet Union in 1956, it was obliged, against its initial objection, to
permit the participation of Soviet athletes in the Melbourne Games
that year. Similarly, France permitted East Germans to participate in
the 1968 Winter Olympics, although the issuance of visas to them
ordinarily would have violated NATO regulations. Finally, contrary to
a U.N. resolution, the West German Government, not a U.N. member,
has drawn upon these Olympic precedents to clear the way for the
participation of Rhodesian athletes in the 1972 Games. In each of
these cases, a conflict of laws was settled by the waiver of municipal
visa requirements and the issuance of special clearance papers.

Thus, we can readily see the problems in merely "bring[ing]
together the athletes of the world," much less in "thereby creating
international respect and goodwill." But the Olympic regime nevertheless has proven effective in resisting a preponderance of diplomatic
machinations within the Olympic arena 75 and in assuring a continuing
measure of universality to the Games. In doing so, the Olympic model
depends not on the efforts of the I.O.C. alone, but, perhaps more
importantly, on a close working association between the I.O.C. and
the international federations, and on the national committees which
are charged "not to associate themselves with affairs of a political or
commercial nature' 7' 6 but to "be completely independent
and
77
autonomous and [to] resist all political... pressure."1
Beyond the success of the Olympic rules in promoting stability in
transnational sports competition, the potential impact of the Olympic
model in harmonizing nation-state interaction is apt to be limited.
controversial. According to one viewpoint, the use of national symbols, unlike the
use of the Olympic torch, flag and other symbols designed to promote
association, unnecessarily promotes international rivalry and derogates from the
individualized spirit of the competition. An opposing viewpoint identified
especially with the developing countries and those of the socialist bloc, maintains
that their use serves to stimulate all three classes of Olympic participants, as well
as the public. This seems to have been the view of the national Olympic
committees during their 1969 Dubrovnik meeting when they approved the
practice of raising national flags and playing national anthems. 3 SPORT, Nos. 5 &
6 (Prague 1969).
75. At times, the I.O.C. has taken positive action to discourage politics from
entering the sports arena. For example, it suspended Indonesia in 1962 for
refusing to permit Israeli and Taiwanese athletes to come to Djakarta for that
year's Asian Games. See also J. MEYNAUD, supra note 1.
76. RULE 24, supra note 15.

77. RULE 25, supra note 15.
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Indeed, the wisest course for the I.O.C. would seem to be that of
maintaining a delicate balance between a tolerance for national
identity, with its presumed importance in generating mass public
interest in sports, and the individual-oriented spirit of the Olympic
model, with its importance in dampening potentially disruptive
factionalism. Such a balance is encouraged by existing rules, which
permit the display of national symbols at appropriate times, while at
the same time advancing the overarching Olympic ideal by means of
such well known symbols as the torch runner and the Olympic
emblem, with its interlocking rings; and by denying official recognition to national standings based on the composite scores of
individual participants.
C. Ping-PongDiplomacy
"and thus helping to construct a... more peaceful world

' 78

In April, 1971, during the 31st World Table Tennis Championships
in Nagoya, Japan, the government of the Peoples' Republic of China
invited the United States table tennis team to visit mainland China.
The invitation was the first one officially extended to a group of
United States citizens since the establishment of the Peking Government and it was quickly accepted by the team members. During the
visit, media accounts consistently emphasized the warmth of both the
reception and the interaction of hosts and guests.' 9 As the United
States press noted, ping-pong, with its onomatopoetic symbolism of
initiative and response, was an especially appropriate metaphor for the
process of rapprochement between the two countries. Later, the
United States Government officially proposed a reciprocal visit by
Chinese players. Fresh diplomatic overtures, including the President's
acceptance of an invitation to visit China, followed. For their part, the
Chinese succeeded in generating an immense amount of favorable
global opinion in a manner that saved face for both countries involved.

Rarely has athletic competition been employed so effectively as a tool
of international diplomacy.
The timing and location of the Chinese invitation was propitious.
It occurred in the year of China's return to world table tennis
competition after a six year absence. The United States appeared to be
78. RULE 3, supra note 15.
79. It should, of course, be remembered that similar invitations were

extended to other co-participants from the United Kingdom, Canada, Colombia
and Nigeria. The circumstances of the invitation nevertheless indicate strongly
that bilateral considerations centered on Chinese-American relations were para-

mount in the Chinese initiatives.
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committed to a gradual renewal of amicable ties with China,8 ° and
had in fact already implemented unilateral offers of cultural exchange
and limited trade. It was also significant that the United States had
begun its military withdrawal from Viet Nam.
The Chinese seem to have taken pains to de-emphasize any
political underpinnings of their hospitality, ostensibly inviting the
Americans so that each side could learn athletic skills from the other
and thereby elevate their standards of performance. 8 ' This represented a significant change from the stridently political International Table Tennis Tournament hosted in 1966 by Peking, at
which almost all participants were from countries friendly with China.
But there are games that nations as well as people play, and no doubt
the Chinese felt that the prevailing political atmosphere was most
conducive to this move. The demise of the Cultural Revolution and
perhaps the inclination of some United States citizens to engage in
interpersonal diplomacy in pursuit of peace in Indochina encouraged
rapprochement with the United States.
The Chinese wisely selected a posture which stressed the merits of
conducting "people's diplomacy" in preference to nation-state dealings. Two incidental aspects of this approach are noteworthy: first,
the hosts chose a sport in which any competitive tension would be
minimized, and the visitor's national prestige least tied to athletic
success; second, the almost simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese
from the International Lawn Tennis Federation in protest over the
admission of Taiwan to membership indicates that ping-pong diplomacy operates only within an organizational context free of the "two
China" threat or any other possible undermining of the 8 fundamental
tenets of Communist Chinese sovereignty and diplomacy. 2
The relevance of ping-pong diplomacy to the present discussion is
to illustrate the continuing interplay of politics and the pseudo-events
of sports competition. The role of an athletic contest seems to be,
first, to provide an orderly, ritualized, but politically harmless setting
for initiating a process of interaction among former adversaries;
second, to prepare for diplomatic contacts by means of interpersonal
contacts that are consonant with conceptions of "people's
diplomacy"; third, through public opinion to stimulate popular
approval of forthcoming diplomatic initiatives; and, fourth, to permit
the host some assurance of victory without significant loss-of-face to
guest nationals.
80. For example, the notation on United States passports of their invalidity
for travel to China had been scrapped only three weeks prior to the invitation.
81. See 14 PEKING REV. 10-12 (1971).
82. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1971, at 7, col. 1 (city ed.).
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It is unlikely that ping-pong diplomacy would be as effective within
the Olympic arena. There, the lack of bilateral confrontation and the
diffusion of actors and types of encounter renders directed, bilateral
diplomacy almost impossible. Participation in the Olympics, however,
may serve either intentionally or inadvertently as a less dramatic

process of encounter among political adversaries in which political
stakes are minimal and the highly ritualized nature of the interaction
is predetermined and therefore dependable. With this potential, the
pertinent rules should continue to be designed and exercised to permit
maximum participation without regard to national affiliation.
In any event, the minimal impact that the Olympic model may
have for the promotion of friendly relations among nation-states
should not diminish expectations that other forums of sports
competition, particularly bilateral ones, will continue to serve as
relatively low risk, face-saving vehicles of rapprochement. Thus in
August, 1971, the government of Syria opened its doors to American
citizens for the first time in several years by inviting a United States
team to participate in an international basketball tournament. This
invitation arrived amid reports of a growing interest of the Syrian
Government to improve its relations with the United States. Once
again, sports competition represented a calculated first step.
D. The Protectionof Human Rights
"and thus helping to construct a better... world."8 3
Rule 1 of the Olympic Rules and Regulations prohibits discrimination in the Games against any country or person on grounds of race,
religion or politics. Moreover, rule 34 requires that "National
Olympic Committees must... make sure that no one has been left
out for racial, religious, or political reasons." These provisions have
served as legal references for a growing controversy within the I.O.C.
concerning the relationship between the I.O.C. and participants from

nation-states whose governments pursue racist domestic policies. To
be sure, rule 1 appears simply to bar the I.O.C. from three types of
discrimination against participants and their parent countries and,
indeed, might at first be interpreted to bar the I.O.C. from
"discriminating" against countries which pursue politically racist
policies. But the I.O.C. is charged also with supervision of the
obligations of the national committees, which, as noted above, are
responsible under rule 34 for assuring that "no one has been left out
for racial.., reasons." The I.O.C. has, therefore, invoked rule 1 to
83. RULE 3, supra note 15.
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bar participation of nationals of several countries, reasoning that
admission of persons from countries whose governments engage in
racial discrimination would put the I.O.C. in the position of
sanctioning de facto segregation against the victims of the discriminatory policies. In adopting this principle, the prime targets of the I.O.C.
have been the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. Each
presents an illuminating case history.
1. South-Africa.-All South African athletes were prevented from
participating in the 1964 Olympics because of opposition to a strict
apartheid policy that restricted South African Olympic candidates to
whites. Between the 1964 and 1968 Olympics, the South African
Government agreed to adopt a non-discriminatory policy of training,
selecting8 4 and lodging its Olympic participants, but continued to
enforce its policy against the holding of multi-racial competition
within the country by insisting on segregated trials. Despite this latter
manifestation of a continued adherence to apartheid policies, the
I.O.C. decided by majority vote on February 15, 1968, that South
Africa was in fact meeting the standards demanded by the Olympic
rules and could therefore participate in the Mexico City Games.
Thirty-two nations, however, were incensed by South Africa's
apartheid restrictions on tryouts for membership on teams, and
threatened a boycott of the Games by their nationals unless the I.O.C.

excluded South African nationals. The I.O.C. President, apparently
adhering to a strict interpretation of rule 1, maintained that South
Africa had satisfied the literal requirements of rule 1 and that an
exclusion would harm South Africa's black athletes more than anyone
else. Throughout the controversy his basic premise was that "[w] e
can't change the politics of any country-that's not our business."
Furthermore, he maintained that "if participation in sport is to be
stopped every time the laws of humanity are violated, there will never
be any international contests."' I The goals of promoting world
athletic participation and the implementation of global standards of
human rights were in seeming conflict.
Pressure quickly mounted in favor of rescinding the invitation to
the South Africans. The Olympic host, Mexico, was justifiably nervous
about the probable effect of a massive boycott of the games, and an
incipient black-power movement threatening the composition and
quality of the U.S. team. On the request of the Supreme Council for

84. The selection was to be performed by an eight-man committee consisting
of four whites and four non-whites.
85. Furlong, A Bad Week for Mr. B., SPORTS ILLUS., March 11, 1968, at
18.
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Sports in Africa, representing 33 African nations, and supported by a
South African black pressure group, the I.O.C. President under the
"urgency" provision of rule 20 agreed to submit a resolution by mail
to the I.O.C. members that would bar South African participation in
8 6
the 1968 games.
The I.O.C. voted to rescind the invitation. Its decision was
supported and amplified after the games by the U.N. General
Assembly, 8 7 which requested all states and organizations to suspend
domestic sports competition with South Africa and any organizations
and institutions in that country which continued to practice
apartheid. The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, established in January, 1970, called for strict implementation of the resolution. The Committee publicized the identity of
both violators and adherents of the resolution.8 8 On May 15, 1970,
the I.O.C. voted to exclude not only South African competitors from
the 1972 games, but also their national committee from the Olympic
Movement.
Pressures exerted through sports competition to protect human
rights in South Africa are apt to be surprisingly effective because of
the importance traditionally given to athletics in South Africa, which
even has a Minister of Sports. Consequently, it is not surprising that
the application of legal sanctions by the I.O.C. and affiliated

international sports federations has in every instance resulted in more
liberal policies and practices in South African sports competition.

86. Lobbying for the banishment of South African nationals was skillfully
led by a Congolese, Jean Claude Ganya. In addition to what was reported to be a
well argued brief in legal support of his position, Mr. Ganya was substantially
aided by current fears of a retaliatory boycott by United States black athletes.
Moreover, the Congolese Government had created a receptive atmosphere by
presenting the President of the I.O.C. with the Insignia of the Commander of the
Republic of the Congo.
87. The General Assembly obviously assumed that its intervention did not
contravene article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which provides: "Nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present

Charter ....

."

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2. para. 7.

88. G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/7348
(1968).
89. See, e.g., Statements by Gary Player, Arthur Ashe and Dennis Brutus in
Racism and InternationalSports, 2 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE, No. 3, at 4 (U.N.
Office of Public Information, July, 1970). The latter two individuals appeared
before the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid.
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In addition to these actions by the U.N. and the I.O.C., pressure
from various other sources has been leveled against the South African
Government to modify its racial restrictions in sports competition.
Objections and threats were voiced by the otherwise conservative
South African Cricket Association when the Pretoria Government
refused to allow two non-white cricketers to accompany a domestic
team on a tour of Australia. The International Amateur Athletics
Federation and the International Lawn Tennis Association have both
taken stands against the South African policy. Nationally and
internationally prominent athletes have demanded reform.8 9 In
response, the South African Government has further eased its rules in
several selected sports-principally lawn tennis and Olympic competition. 9 0 Despite this undoubted improvement, much unpalatable
racism remains. For example, multi-racial teams of South Africans are
still prohibited; thus, South African participation in international
sporting events would be by teams or groups of racially segregated
athletes. White and non-white South African teams cannot compete
against each other except in "international" events. 9' Furthermore,
whites are prohibited from watching matches between white and
non-white teams.
The impact of the Olympic sanctions on the easing of apartheidin
South Africa is demonstrated not only by the announcement of the
policy with its special provisions for integration of participation in
Olympic sports, but in the decision of the South African Amateur
Athletic Union in taking a first step to get back into the Olympic
Games by organizing a completely integrated invitational meet to be
held there in 1972.92
The world community may well continue to be dissatisfied with
the slow pace of incursions into the policy of apartheid and will no
doubt wish to continue to press for further change. 93 But even a brief
90. See Washington Post, April 20, 1971, § D, at 3, col. 3; id., April 23, 1971,
§ D at 4, col. 2. The Davis Cup organization has responded by lifting a
controversial two year ban on South African participation, while at the same time
maintaining a ban on Rhodesian participation in view of U.N. sanctions against
Rhodesia. Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1972, § C, at 3, col. 4.
91. See Washington Post, June 20, 1971, § C, at 6, col. 5. This is an account
of the first competition between white and non-white South African athletes,
which took place in Salisbury, Rhodesia. Because of the participation of athletes
from Malawi and Rhodesia, the competition was "international" under the new
South African definition.
92. Announcement of the South African Amateur Athletic Union, May 16,
1971.
93. For an interesting commentary on the efficacy of another non-governmental initiative in combatting apartheid,see generally Reisman, PolaroidPower:
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study of the Olympics regime verifies its efficacy in setting in motion
a gradual transformation in an external system, a transformation
attributable both to a combination of Olympic influences and to
special cultural factors in the target country.
A global consensus to exclude individuals of target nation-states
from such an important stage of non-political interaction as the
Olympics, if judiciously employed, may well provide one of the
sharpest tools for implementing such broad human objectives as racial
equality. The conversion of the Olympic model from a politically free
to a politically involved instrument of human rights is consonant with
the injunction of rule 3, and may eventually prove to be one of the
most significant contributions to world order of organized, transnational sports competition.
2. Rhodesia.-The apartheid policies of the Rhodesian Government 9 4 have had only limited recent application to sports competition. Multi-racial competition of foreign teams is permitted in the
country, and multi-racial teams representing Rhodesia have competed
outside the country since July, 1971. An investigatory mission
dispatched by the I.O.C. reported favorably on conditions in
Rhodesia, and recommended that country's continued involvement in
the Games. Accordingly, the Rhodesian Olympic Committee, which
was not invited to participate in the 1968 Olympics, has been invited
for 1972. In response to this invitation, 20 of the 24 members of the
U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization adopted a resolution
which urged the I.O.C. to take urgent steps to "suspend the so-called

'National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia' from its membership and
to ask the Organizing Committee of the 20th Olympic Games to annul
forthwith its invitation for the Olympic Games in Munich." 9 S
The response of the I.O.C. to the resolution of the U.N. Special
Committee struck a sensible compromise that served to accommodate
the relatively favorable situation for black athletes in Rhodesia, to
distinguish Rhodesia from South Africa in this respect, and permit
Rhodesian nationals to compete in 1972, and yet to suspend official
recognition of an independent, white-supremist government in
Taxing Business for Human Rights, 4 FOREIGN POLICY 101 (1971). The U.N.
General Assembly recently adopted a resolution that expressed its concern and
"affirmed that merit should be the sole criterion for participation in sports
activities." U.N. Press Release WS/531, at 3, Dec. 3, 1971 (publicizing adoption of
G.A. Res. 2775 D).
94. Separative practices are encouraged by the laws and policies of Rhodesia.
See, e.g., Zimmerli, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Southern Rhodesia, 20

INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 239 (1971).
95. Decolonization Committee Deplores Olympic Invitation to Rhodesian
Team, U.N. Press Release WS/501, at 4, May 7, 1971.
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Salisbury. On September 10, 1971, during a joint meeting between the
I.O.C. Executive Board and representatives of the National Olympic
Committees, the President of the I.O.C., referring to his recent
meetings with African delegates to the joint meetings, proposed on
behalf of the committees that a Rhodesian team compete with the
same flag and anthem, namely the Union Jack and British anthem,
under which they had competed in the "pre-independence" 1964
Games while still a member of the British Commonwealth, and that
the matter be reviewed after the 1972 Games.9 6 The proposal, which
had been drafted by a special commission consisting of an Australian,

a Nigerian, and a Swiss national, already had been accepted by both
the Rhodesian delegation, participating as an observer, and their
adversaries from black Africa. It had also been endorsed by the
Permanent General Assembly of the National Olympic Committees
(70 affirmative votes to 6 abstentions). The I.O.C. Executive Board
concurred.
The Rhodesian compromise is especially interesting because it is
explicitly premised in the "uncertain international position" of
Rhodesia. Accordingly, although the Rhodesian team will be identified by colonial symbols it has rejected, and may therefore decline to
compete in the 1972 Games, no official political significance is to be
attributed to these symbols. At the same time, no recognition will be
given to the "post-independence" regime, since its trappings will be
barred from the Games. Thus, the Olympic system was able to meet
the threat of politicization, and at the same time to apply basic
standards of participation in a highly political context in order to
encourage the involvement of a national entity in one of the only
spheres of human interaction in which that national entity has, for
whatever reason, committed itself to global standards of racial
non-discrimination. Unlike the South African context, that of
Rhodesia may not admit of any further impact on internal development from Olympic participatory standards; nevertheless, it is
significant that the Olympic system has proven capable of positively
encouraging sovereign adherence to basic human rights. In doing so, an
acceptable resolution of an essentially political issue was achieved
without further politicizing the system.
96. I.O.C., REPORT, supra note 38, at 9.
97. The 1973 Olympic Congress to be held in Sofia, Bulgaria will bring
together all components of the Olympic organization and will address three
themes: the promotion of the Olympic Movement and amateur sport; the
definition of jurisdictions among the I.O.C., the international federations and the
national committees; and a consideration of the pattern and resulting consequences of future Olympic Games. I.O.C., REPORT, supra note 38, at 10.
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IV. CONCLUSION
These four studies confirm the continuing vitality of sports
competition as a setting for transnational interaction involving both

political and non-political participants. In examining the Olympic
organization as a paradigm, we have.seen that this vitality is nourished
not only by such technical rules as qualifying standards, but by
organizational rules as well. These organizational rules, particularly
rules I and 26, are playing an increasingly important role in internal
dispute settlement and pattern maintenance within the Olympic
Movement. In the process of creating, invoking and applying them, the
Olympic organization has come to rely less on administrative
discretion and more on formal decision-making.
As we have seen, the Olympic organization has performed
satisfactorily in meeting the perceived threats to its internal operation
of professionalism and politicization, despite external pressures to
yield to these threats. Whether the success of the Olympic organization in maintaining internal order and stability bodes well for the
accomplishment of the lofty goals expressed in rule 3 is of great
interest. Available historical and sociological data do not indicate any
inherent capacity of sports competition to create world order and
integration. Nevertheless, the growth of Olympic decision-making as a
rule-oriented process offers much promise. We have seen that in
insisting upon an adherence to a minimum global standard of racial
equality, the I.O.C. has employed legal tools as much as elitist
discretion to convert the Olympics into a potentially effective agent of
human aspirations. Moreover, recent experience outside the Olympic
context with "ping-pong diplomacy" teaches us that transnational
sports competition may serve as a setting for international rapprochement.
The regulation of transnational sports competition has been
concerned primarily with the enhancement of association among
competitors, rather than with the inducement of cooperation among
them sufficient to spill over into the global environment. 9 7 What
sustained contributions the Olympic organization has made to world
order seem to have been more the unintended consequences of
pluralistic decision-making than the result of a conscientious promotion of its organizational goals. In this respect, the I.O.C. has
performed in a manner similar to the I.L.O. Nevertheless, as the
Olympic Movement becomes legitimatized through the growing
authority of its rules, its decision-making structure may be expected

to become more goal-oriented. As the techniques of the 1.O.C. develop
to implement the values and goals that transcend its internal system,
the Olympic organization may well assume importance as an agent of
world order.

